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INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF THE LEGALITY OF ACTS ADOPTED
BY UNITED NATIONS ORGANS
Giovanni Distefano
Professor of International Law
At the University of Neuchatel

Abstract:
This brief article endeavours to tackle the thorny question of
the judicial control of acts adopted by United Nations Organs. The
analysis is strictly confined to the international judicial control of
two specific organs, i.e. Security Council and General Assembly.
Contrary to many domestic legal systems, where such judicial
control is envisaged either by an explicit empowerment or by a
constitutional custom, a similar entrustment is not envisaged by
the United Nations Charter. Therefore, a specific jurisdictional
entitlement is needed for the International Court of Justice to
assess the validity of a resolution adopted by the two
aforementioned organs. This has been the case through the
seisine, in the case of a contentious case brought before her, or a
through a specific request of advisory opinion made by one of the
organs vested with this power by the United Nations Charter, that
is to say, according to its Article 96 (1), Security Council and
General Assembly. This has in fact hitherto occurred 7 times since
the entry into force of the United Nations Charter. Finally, one of
the most far-reaching international judicial reviews of the validity
of acts adopted by a United Nations organ, has been wielded by a
Court outside the UN System, i.e. the Court of Justice of European
Union. This article eventually delves into all these judgments and
advisory opinions rendered by the International Court of Justice
and the Court of Luxembourg.
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1. Remarks on the United Nations Charter
It is undisputed that every United Nations (hereinafter: UN) organ,
just like any organ of any International Organization (hereinafter : I.O.),
must, in order to fulfil its mission attributed by the latter, respect: a) the
obligations contained in the constitutive treaty (as the organ is
“enslaved” to the constitutive charter)(1); b) the obligations contracted
by the I.O. (convention,(2) contracts under member States’ domestic law,
etc.); c) public international law (hereinafter: PIL),(3) including, above all,
peremptory international law rules (jus cogens).(4) In this last respect,
Article 103 of the United Nations Charter (hereinafter UNC) cannot
prevent the operation of jus cogens, so that the latter will always prevail
over conflicting UNC obligations (including those conveyed by the United
Nations Security Council(5) resolutions). As the Court affirmed in its 1980
advisory opinion:
“International organizations are subjects of international law and, as
such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general
rules of international law, under their constitutions or under
international agreements to which they are parties”(6)
The conformity of any organ activity to the constitutive instrument
thus represents a topical issue of constitutionality, which must be
addressed while having in mind the institutional dimension of the

(1) ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment (Appeals Chamber) of October 3, 1995, § 28.
(2) See for instance (with regard to the EU): Racke case (C-162/96), Court of Justice of the European
Union hereinafter: CJEU, Judgment of June 16, 1998, § 41.
(3) As the CJEU declared: “It should be noted in that respect that, as is demonstrated by the Court's
judgment in Case C-286/90 Poulsen and Diva Navigation [1992] ECR I-6019, paragraph 9, the European
Community must respect international law in the exercise of its powers. It is therefore required to comply
with the rules of customary international law when adopting a regulation suspending the trade
concessions granted by, or by virtue of, an agreement which it has concluded with a non-member
country”, Racke case, § 45.
(4) See: K. Zemanek, “The legal foundations of the international system : general course on public
international law “, RCADI, vol. 266 (1997), 231-232.
(5) Hereinafter: UNSC
(6) Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion of
December 20, 1980, ICJ Reports 1980, § 37.
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instrument establishing an I.O.(1) Last but not least, it ought not to be
forgotten or even underrated that the establishment of an I.O. can by no
means serve as a purpose for Member States to shy away from the
application of PIL. In short, to erect a shield between States and PIL by
setting up an I.O. would both be unlawful and devoid of any legal
effect.(2) In fact, it would be at variance with the spirit and the letter of
PIL since an I.O. is a tool aimed at international cooperation and not a
means allowing Members States to shy the Empire of Law away.
Notwithstanding this general obligation for UNO to abide by the Law,
there is a complete absence of jurisdictional control by the ICJ, which, in
spite of its pompous denomination conferred by the UNC (“principal
judiciary organ”),(3) was not bestowed with power of judicial review.(4) In
(1) A State owes its existence to a sheer fact (sometimes violent ones) while a I.O. may only exist by dint
of an international treaty regulating its creation, thus serving as its birth declaration, and establishing its
own rules of operation. This legal act possesses both institutional and conventional characters; indeed,
while it is shaped as a multilateral treaty (that is, conventional), its substance rather mirrors the creation
of a State (that is, institutional).(1) It is then appropriate to conciliate the formal (i.e. its origins)
dimension of the constitutive instrument with its striking constitutional aspect. As the ICJ affirmed in its
1996 Advisory opinion: “From a formal standpoint, the constitutive instruments of international
organizations are multilateral treaties, to which the well-established rules of treaty interpretation apply
… But the constitutive instruments of international organizations are also treaties of a particular type;
their object is to create new subjects of law endowed with a certain autonomy, to which the parties
entrust the task of realizing common goals. Such treaties can raise specific problems of interpretation
owing, inter alia, to their character which is conventional and at the same time institutional; the very
nature of the organization created, the objectives which have been assigned to it by its founders, the
imperatives associated with the effective performance of its functions, as well as its own practice, are all
elements which may deserve special attention when the time comes to interpret these constitutive
treaties”, Legality of the Use of by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion of July
8, 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, § 19.
(2) As the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: ECHR) affirmed in an uncontroversial passage:
“The Court is of the opinion that where States establish international organisations in order to pursue or
strengthen their cooperation in certain fields of activities, and where they attribute to these
organisations certain competences and accord them immunities, there may be implications as to the
protection of fundamental rights. It would be incompatible with the purpose and object of the
Convention, however, if the Contracting States were thereby absolved from their responsibility under the
Convention in relation to the field of activity covered by such attribution”, Waite and Kennedy v.
Germany (Case 26083/94), Judgement of February 18, 1999, § 67.
(3) As provided for in Art. 92 UNC.
(4) On the contrary, in such cases as provided by some IOs constitutive instrument, the Court has been
empowered to scrutinize the validity of the acts adopted by the former organs. In this regard: Appeal
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addition, it must be underlined that, without going so far as reviewing
the validity of another UN organ, the Court is obviously empowered to
interpret it(1) and define its scope and even its legal effects.(2)
In general, we observe that I.O.s do not possess, in most cases, a
centralized control for the validity of the acts of their organs. Hence, one
of the most striking contradictions is represented by the fact that, on the
one hand, UN organs are subject to general international law and
particularly to the UNC, but, on the other hand, the latter does not
provide for a jurisdictional mechanism of control and review of their
acts. This issue, practically dormant since 1945 – with the notable
exceptions of Certain Expenses (1962) and Namibia (1971) –, has led to
an abundant literature since the end of the Cold War and the
consequential awakening of the UNSC.
Before addressing the issue of judicial review of UN organs’ activities,
one should recall that PIL provides for other means of control which,
albeit being non-jurisdictional, may represent an efficient instrument for
the fulfilment of this purpose. They are not specific to the I.O., but they
belong to the traditional toolbox of the international lawyer: protest,
silence, acquiescence, recognition and the like.(3) In short, if Member
States, and especially those sitting in the organ concerned, consider that
the latter has either trespassed its competence, infringed the procedure,
carried out an act at variance with public international law at large, or if
its conduct has somehow arisen a problem of constitutionality, then they
are allowed to react in view of challenging its legality. They can resort to

Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pakistan), Judgement of August 18, 1972, ICJ
Reports 1972, § 26.
(1) However, one ought to stress, this power is not at all exclusive, since given the equality of UN
principal organs between them, it was agreed during the San Francisco Conference, that none of them
could impose a binding interpretation of the UNC to another organ. See infra note 27.
(2) See in this regard: East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgement of June 30, 1995, ICJ Reports 1995, §§
30-32.
(3) Admittedly, UNC has been modified by way of tacit agreement (or custom) in quite a few of its
provisions, States resorting to these means instead of triggering the heavy and lengthy procedure
envisaged by UNC Chapter XVIII.
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protest and even refuse to abide by it.(1) This approach is a horizontal
one, i.e. Member States compensate the lack of a centralized
(institutional) control (that is, provided by the constitutive instrument)
by reverting to classical PIL means. In this regard, one shall not forget
that PIL, unless clearly derogated from by the constitutive instrument, is
still applicable and govern State conducts, inside or outside the I.O.
concerned. The conduct and decision-making of the Member States is
thus paramount for the adoption of the secondary organs’ acts. They
can, for instance, express their doubts as to a potential illegality of the
organ’s decisions by making statements in this respect. Their silence,
their agreement, or a fortiori their conduct or explicit statements play a
great role in determining the validity of an act carried out by a UN
organ.(2) As Parties to the treaty creating the Organization, and thus the
organ, they are empowered to interpret, according to international law,
the legality of an organ’s act in the light of the Law of Treaties,(3) and can
possibly react accordingly (e.g. not to apply the contested resolution).(4)
This wide array of the classical means of determination-interpretation of
international law reflect the horizintak dimension of the international
legal system.
Therefore, such a rudimentary control by Member States can be
envisaged even within the UN, and it was indeed contemplated during
the preparatory works of the UNC at San Francisco in 1945.(5) Now,
(1) See: K. Zemanek, cit. (1997), 96-97.
(2) “Finally, this 15-member Council acts on behalf of a total of 175 States Members of the United
Nations. This means that 160 States have placed their security, and possibly their very survival, in the
hands of the 15. This is a solemn and heavy responsibility that each and every member of the Council
carries. It is therefore of crucial importance that every decision taken by the Security Council be able to
withstand the careful scrutiny of the 160 Member States on whose behalf the Council is expected to act.
This is only possible if the Council insists on being guided in its decisions and actions by the Charter and
other international conventions”, Intervention of Zimbabwe, UN Doc. S/PV.3063 (31 March 1992) before
the UNSC (relating to the UNSC’s action during the crisis sparked by Lockerbie’s incident), 54-55.
(3) Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties hereinafter: VCLT 1969.
(4) In this vein: A. Tzanakopoulos, Disobeying the Security Council: Countermeasures against Wrongful
Sanctions, Oxford, 2011.
(5) “In brief, the Members or the organs of the Organization might have recourse to various possible
expedients in order to obtain an appropriate interpretation. It would appear neither necessary nor
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coming back to the judicial control by the ICJ, a few words must be said
about UNC’s travaux préparatoires. In fact, the possibility for the ICJ to
review the conformity of a UNSC resolution (under Chapter VI of the
UNC) with PIL was evoked. In this context, the idea that UNSC could
force a Member State to settle a dispute following the terms of its
resolution potentially at odds with “positive international law” was
feared by some States. Quite understandably, this concern stemmed
from small States (in the case in point, Belgium) which therefore
proposed that in such circumstances, “the State could ask the
International Court whether the decision or recommendation of the
Council [under Chapter VI] infringed the essential rights of the member.
If the Court so decided, the Council would then have to reconsider the
question or refer the dispute to the General Assembly.”(1) The issue was
somehow solved by a double action: a) on one side, it was stressed that,
in carrying out its functions, the UNSC has to stay within the realm of PIL;
b) on the other side, “Council recommendations [under 37 § 2 UNC]
would not be obligatory.”(2) Therefore, while Member States are not
bound to follow UNSC recommendation to settle a dispute according to
the terms contained therein, the thorny question of judicial control was,
though, left unprejudiced.(3)
Therefore, since no special and explicit powers have been vested with
the ICJ the UNC, the Court’s faculty to review (and maybe) declare the
desirable to list or to describe in the Charter the various possible expedients. It is to be understood, of
course, that if an interpretation made by any organ of the Organization or by a committee of jurists is not
generally acceptable it will be without binding force. In such circumstances, or in cases where it is desired
to establish an authoritative interpretation as a precedent for the future, it may be necessary to embody
the interpretation in an amendment to the Charter. This may always be accomplished by recourse to the
procedure provided for amendment”, United Nations Conference on International Organization) UNCIO,
Report of the Rapporteur of Committee IV/2, Doc. 933 (IV/2/42 (2)), Printed documents, vol. XIII, 709
emphasis added.
(1) R. Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter, Washington, 1958, 664.
(2) Ibid., 665.
(3) For further elaboration on this topic, see: G. Distefano, E. Henry, “The International Court of Justice
and the Security Council: disentangling Themis from Ares”, in The ICJ and the Evolution of International
Law. The enduring impact of the Corfu Channel case, ed. by K. Bannelier, Th. Christakis and S. Heathcote,
London, 2012, 60-84.
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invalidity of UN organs acts, can only be found in its general
competences stated in the UNC as well as in its Statute.
It is well established that the Court can exercise – according to its
Statute – both contentious and advisory functions. As for the former, the
Court may settle any dispute between Member States, while for the
latter the Court is vested with the power to render an Advisory opinion if
so requested by the UNSC, the General Assembly hereinafter: UNGA
(Article 96 (1) UNC), any authorized organ of the UN or by any UN
specialized agency, duly authorized by the UNGA (Art. 96 (2) UNC).(1)
2. Judicial Review by the International Court of Justice
Time has come to browse ICJ’s case-law in order to assess whether,
while accomplishing its functions, the Court has ever been led review the
validity of an act carried out by a UN organ. In fact, grossly speaking, the
Court has hitherto been faced in five advisory opinions and two
contentious cases; in both of its functions, it had to deal with a UNGA
resolution on four occasions, and twice with a UNSC’s. Hereafter we will
try to focus on the ICJ’s reasoning in a timeline perspective.
In Conditions of admission case (1948), the Court adamantly ruled out
that it was empowered to enquire into the reasons which might have
prompted a Member to vote in a certain manner within the UNGA,
“such reasons, which enter into a mental process, are obviously subject
to no control.”(2) Indeed, those “reasons” belonged to the discretionary
power inherent to both UN political organs, and as such fundamentally
escape the Court scrutiny.
(1) At least theoretically it can be envisaged an advisory opinion requested by UNGA in matter of UNSC
activities. However, even if this approach can be based on the black-letter law of the UNC, it is hardly
viable from a political point of view. However, as underlined by several leading scholars (i.a.: C.
Tomuschat, “International law: ensuring the survival of mankind on the eve of a new century: general
course on public international law”, RCADI, vol. 281 (1999), 424-428), the review the validity of UNSC
(and other organ’s) resolutions through the advisory function remains a powerful tool in the hands of the
ICJ and, upstream, in those of the UNGA which shall have to so request.
(2) Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the United
Nations Charter), Advisory opinion of May 28, 1948, ICJ Reports 1948, 60.
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In the second case – Certain expenses (1962) – the Court was faced
with the question of alleged unconstitutionality of some UNGA and
UNSC recommendations establishing peace-keeping forces (in the
Middle East and Congo).(1) Since some Member States were challenging
the competence of the UNGA and UNSC and thus the validity of the
relevant resolutions, the UNGA asked the Court to verify their
constitutionality. It is more specifically with regard to the UNGA’s power
to establish peace-keeping forces, that the Court made highly interesting
developments. The Court response was twofold; after having established
that the UNGA possesses indeed a secondary responsibility in matters of
maintenance and restoration of peace and security,(2) the Court affirmed
that:
“If it is agreed that the action in question is within the scope of the
functions of the Organization but it is alleged that it has been initiated or
carried out in a manner not in conformity with the division of functions
among the several organs which the Charter prescribes, one moves to
the internal plane, to the internal structure of the Organization. If the
action was taken by the wrong organ, it was irregular as a matter of that
internal structure, but this would not necessarily mean that the expense
incurred was not an expense of the Organization. Both national and
international law contemplate cases in which the body corporate or
politic may be bound, as to third parties, by an ultra vires act of an
agent”(3)
The Court thus seems to shy away from the disputed question – did
the UNGA has the power to establish peace-keeping forces and,
consequently, were Member States bound to pay for them? – preferring
instead to focus on the competence of the UN as a whole. But then, if
the Court kept a low-profile approach in this regard, it was quite bold as
(1) Respectively UNEF I (established by the UNGA) and ONUC (established by the UNSC).
(2) Thanks to the ICJ’s Advisory opinion, the constitutionality of the peace-keeping forces recommended
by the INGA will not be challenged anymore.
(3) Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory opinion of July 20, 1962, ICJ Reports 1962, 168
[emphasis added].
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to, in the following paragraph, throw back the argument to UN Member
States:
“In the legal systems of States, there is often some procedure for
determining the validity of even a legislative or governmental act, but no
analogous procedure is to be found in the structure of the United
Nations. Proposals made during the drafting of the Charter to place the
ultimate authority to interpret the Charter in the International Court of
Justice were not accepted; the opinion which the Court is in course of
rendering is an advisory opinion. As anticipated in 1945, therefore, each
organ must, in the first place at least, determine its own jurisdiction” (1)
It sounds clearly like a reproach … Be that as it may, the last sentence
of the quotation clearly suggests that, as sovereign States in the
international realm, every UN organ is “Emperor in its Kingdom.”(2)
Just hardly one year later, the ICJ, faced again with a UNGA
resolution,(3) yet in a contentious case, was adamant in affirming that it
cannot invalidate this organ’s resolutions:
“But the Applicant has stated that it does not ask the Court to
invalidate the plebiscite … If the Court were to proceed and were to hold
that the Applicant's contentions were all sound on the merits, it would
still be impossible for the Court to render a judgment capable of
effective application. The role of the Court is not the same as that of the
General Assembly. The decisions of the General Assembly would not be
reversed by the judgment of the Court. The Trusteeship Agreement
would not be revived and given new life by the judgment”(4)
(1) Loc.cit.
(2) G. Distefano, “Theories on Territorial Sovereignty: A Reappraisal”, Journal of Sharia & Law, vol. 24
(January 2010), 28-33.
(3) The Republic of Cameroon (the Applicant), which obtained independence from France, challenged
Resolution 1608 (XV), by which the UNGA abrogated the Trusteeship Agreement following the plebiscite
previously recommended by the same organ in Northern Cameroons. The Applicant challenged both the
organization of the plebiscite and the administration of this trusteeship territory.
(4) ICJ, Case Concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Judgement of
December 2, 1963 (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports 1963, 33.
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In so doing the Court paved the way for the consecration, a decade
later, of a principle which is consonant with its previous statement
dating back to 1962. In the last episode of the South-Western Africa
(Namibia) judicial saga, the Court was requested by the UNSC to render
an Advisory opinion on the consequences of South-Africa occupation of
that territory (formerly a League of Nations Mandate).(1) South-Africa
argued before the ICJ that the UNSC resolution 276 (1970) was invalid
for several reasons. The Court response left no doubt in this regard:
“A resolution of a properly constituted organ of the United Nations
which is passed in accordance with that organ's rules of procedure, and
is declared by its President to have been so passed, must be presumed
to have been validly adopted”(2)
True, this statement is hardly dissonant with the Court’s previous
stance yet, and here appears the first breach, the Court immediately
added:
“However, since in this instance the objections made concern the
competence of the Court, the Court will proceed to examine them”(3)
The Court did actually review – incidentally(4) – the validity of the
relevant SC resolutions, insofar as it was necessary to establish whether
or not it was validly empowered to render an advisory opinion. Thus, the
conviction emerges within the Court that it can, albeit incidentally (in an
advisory opinion), examine the validity of a SC resolution if so is needed
to correctly discharge its duties under its Statute.
(1) On this topic, see : G. Distefano, “Article 22”, in Commentaire sur le Pacte de la Société des Nations,
sous la direction de R. Kolb, Bruxelles, 2014, 841-1002.
(2) Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion of June 21, 1971, ICJ
Reports 1971, § 25.
(3) Loc.cit.
(4) Even though, the Court hastened to make clear in a subsequent paragraph of the same advisory
opinion, that: “Undoubtedly, the Court does not possess powers of judicial review or appeal in respect of
the decisions taken by the United Nations organs concerned. The question of the validity or conformity
with the Charter of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) or of related Security Council resolutions does
not form the subject of the request for advisory opinion”, § 89.
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In the Lockerbie case (1992), a contentious case brought by Libya, the
Court was asked by the Applicant to indicate provisional measures
pending its judgment on the merits. Libya filed the case asking the Court
to adjudge that the United Kingdom and the United States were
infringing the 1971 Montreal Convention.(1) In a nutshell, Libya
contended that, after the bombing of the Pan Am airplane above the
small Scottish village of “Lockerbie”, it was complying with the Montreal
convention according to which a State could, itself, either extradite or
judge those persons deemed to be responsible. In fact, Libya assured the
Court that it was willing to judge the two alleged responsible individuals
(Libyan nationals, by the way) by its own tribunals. Yet, UNSC had
adopted resolution 748 (1992) imposing economic sanctions only Libya
unless it ceased its support for international terrorism and extradited
those responsible for the bombing. Therefore, it was argued by Libya
that it was faced with two conflicting obligations: one, flowing from the
UNSC resolution (requesting the extradition), the other, contained in the
Montreal convention, providing either for the judgment or the
extradition. Hence, in order to avoid further sanctions, Libya also
requested the ICJ to order the Defendant to cease their alleged wrongful
acts towards it, i.e. economic sanctions. As for the request of provisional
measures, the ICJ restrained itself to state:
“Whereas both Libya and the United States, as Members of the
United Nations, are obliged to accept and carry out the decisions of the
Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter; whereas
the Court, which is at the stage of proceedings on provisional measures,
considers that prima facie this obligation extends to the decision
contained in resolution 748 (1992); and whereas, in accordance with
Article 103 of the Charter, the obligations of the Parties in that respect
prevail over their obligations under any other international agreement,

(1) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at
Montreal in 1971.
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including the Montreal Convention;”(1)
The Court could not say more than “prima facie”, thus not completely
closing the door to a substantive review of the relevant SC resolution
validity. In its subsequent judgement, the Court rejected, with a
comfortable majority, all the Defendant’s preliminary objections and
thus found itself to have jurisdiction to entertain Libya’s claims.
Regrettably, after the three parties to the disputes accomplished their
written and oral pleadings, the ICJ, following an agreement between the
Parties,(2) removed Lockerbie case from its docket just at the time when
it was ready to enter the deliberation phase. Therefore, a good chance
was missed, at least for international law scholars, to know whether the
Court could somehow review SC resolutions.
In 2004, the Court rendered a much-awaited Advisory opinion in the
matter of the construction of the Wall in the Palestinian occupied
territories. Here again, the Court was asked to determine the validity of a
UNGA resolution by rendering an Advisory opinion; in some regards, it
was the same situation as Namibia’s except for the organ concerned. In
the case in point, some States argued before it that the UNGA on
introducing a request to the Court had trespassed its competence, thus
infringing the UNC. The Court observed that the practice in the
application of the Charter had evolved in such a way as to permit the
UNGA to formulate recommendations, in the field of the maintenance
and restoration of peace and security, even though “the matter
remained on the Council’s agenda.”(3)
(1) Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Order of April 14, 1992 (Request for
the Indication of Provisional Measures), ICJ Reports 1992, § 42.
(2) The three Parties found an alternate way to settle their dispute and finally, a Scottish Court sitting in
The Hague and applying UK law, judged the two alleged authors of the bombing: one was acquitted, the
other condemned. In return, Libya having likewise made a compensation for the loss resulting from the
bombing, the UNSC eventually lifted the economic sanctions.
(3) Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion of July 9, 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, § 27. With regard to Article 12 (1) of the UNC, the Court had
previously made the followings observation in this same advisory opinion: “This interpretation of Article
12 has evolved subsequently… The Court considers that the accepted practice of the General Assembly,
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Therefore, the Court did not hesitate to review the UNGA resolution
for the purpose of establishing its jurisdiction to render an Advisory
opinion, thereby discharging its statutory duty.
In the same vein, the Court responded to similar arguments in the
Kosovo case. A long passage of her 2010 advisory opinion deserves of
being quoted since it recapitulates the Court’s prior decisions in this
regard:
“While the interpretation and application of a decision of one of the
political organs of the United Nations is, in the first place, the
responsibility of the organ which took that decision, the Court, as the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations, has also frequently been
required to consider the interpretation and legal effects of such
decisions. It has done so both in the exercise of its advisory jurisdiction
(see for example, Certain Expenses of the United Nations, (Article 17,
paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p.
175; and Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, pp.
51-54, paras. 107-116), and in the exercise of its contentious jurisdiction
(see for example, Questions of the Interpretation and Application of the
as it has evolved, is consistent with Article 12, paragraph 1, of the Charter.” (§§ 27-28). This construction
of Article 12 espoused the Court’s interpretation of another UNC’s key provision, namely Article 24:
Under Article 24 of the Charter the Security Council has "primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security". In this regard it can impose on States "an explicit obligation of
compliance if for example it issues an order or command […] under Chapter VII" and can, to that end,
"require enforcement by coercive action" (Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph
2, of the Charter), Advisory (Opinion, I. C. J. Reports 1962, 163). However, the Court would emphasize that
Article 24 refers to a primary, but not necessarily exclusive, competence. […] As regards the practice of
the United Nations, both the General Assembly and the Security Council initially interpreted and applied
Article 12 to the effect that the Assembly could not make a recommendation on a question concerning
the maintenance of international peace and security while the matter remained on the Council's agenda
… However, this interpretation of Article 12 has evolved subsequently. […] Indeed, the Court notes that
there has been an increasing tendency over time for the General Assembly and the Security Council to
deal in parallel with the same matter concerning the maintenance of international peace and security […]
The Court considers that the accepted practice of the General Assembly, as it has evolved, is consistent
with Article 12, paragraph 1, of the Charter. The Court is accordingly of the view that the General
Assembly […] did not exceed its competence” (§§ 26-28).
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1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order
of 14 April 1992, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 15, paras. 39-41; Questions of
Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United
States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, I.C.J.
Reports 1992, pp. 126-127, paras. 42-44)”(1)
Therefore, the Court seems to affirm that it has the power to interpret
UNSC and UNGA resolutions, which nonetheless is formally a step away
from reviewing their validity. In fact, the Court has gone further at times
by examining (in 1971, 2004, 2010) whether the UN organ had
trespassed its competence. In short, it is not unsound to claim that in the
future the Court might incidentally carry out such a review through a
consultative procedure, or even potentially through a contentious one.(2)
3. Judicial Review by the Court of Justice of the European Union:
However, in the last years, international tribunals belonging to other –
regional – I.O.s have been bolder and dared to cross the line. For
instance, the European Court of Justice (hereinafter: ECJ) has not
hesitated, in accordance with its powers, to review the compatibility of
UNSC resolutions vis-à-vis special rules of the European Union
(hereinafter: EU) and PIL general norms.
Once again, it was a UNSC resolution which was at stake, namely the
“Antiterrorist” resolution 1373 adopted on 28 September 2001, in the
midst of the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and
Washington. This resolution provided inter alia for the freezing of the
assets of persons and entities which participated in, facilitated,
committed, or attempted to commit, terrorist acts. By virtue of the
(1) Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo,
Advisory Opinion of July 22, 2010, ICJ Reports 2010, § 46.
(2) See Resolution 1904 (17 December 2009) in which the Security Council establishes an ombudsman in
charge of the procedure for the defalcation of the person signed up on the black list according to
Resolution 1373 (2001). The mechanism put in place vaguely echoes a contradictory procedure.
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transfer of powers from EU Member States to the EU, the latter had to
comply with the former’s obligations under the UNC. Accordingly, the EU
established “black lists”, i.e. the list of natural and corporate bodies
which were deemed to fall within the category indicated by the UNSC.
Hence, the Tribunal of the ECJ rightly affirmed, and the reasoning may be
easily extended to any other I.O., that since obligations upon EU
Members under the UNC are henceforth incumbent upon the EU:
“first, the Community may not infringe the obligations imposed on its
Member States by the Charter of the United Nations or impede their
performance and, second, that in the exercise of its powers it is bound,
by the very Treaty by which it was established, to adopt all the measures
necessary to enable its Member States to fulfil those obligations”(1)
This entails that EU Member States cannot shield themselves behind
the I.O. in order to escape from their obligations under PIL and, in this
case, of the UNC; this is even more cogent on the grounds of Article 103
UNC, establishing the primacy of the latter vis-à-vis any other “ordinary”
obligation (be it conventional or customary). Yet, on the other hand, the
same argument can be reversed and applied to the UN itself, insofar as
UN Member States cannot empower one of the latter’s organs to infringe
PIL peremptory norms (jus cogens). In this respect, the Tribunal affirmed
that:
“International law thus permits the inference that there exists one
limit to the principle that resolutions of the Security Council have binding
effect: namely, that they must observe the fundamental peremptory
provisions of jus cogens. If they fail to do so, however improbable that
may be, they would bind neither the Member States of the United
Nations nor, in consequence, the Community”(2)

(1) Ahmed Ali Yusuf, residing at Spånga (Sweden), Al Barakaat International Foundation, v. Council of the
European Union and Commission of the European Communities, Case T-306/01, Judgement of the Court
of First Instance (21 September 2005), § 254.
(2) Ibid., § 281.
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By way of consequence, the Tribunal considered itself empowered to
verify whether the EU internal act establishing the “black lists” system, is
compatible with:
“superior rules of international law falling within the ambit of jus
cogens … in particular, the mandatory provisions concerning the
universal protection of human rights, from which neither the Member
States nor the bodies of the United Nations may derogate because they
constitute ‘intransgressible principles of international customary law’
(Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996, The
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Reports 1996, p. 226,
paragraph 79; see also, to that effect, Advocate General Jacobs’s Opinion
in Bosphorus, paragraph 239 above, paragraph 65)”(1)
In the case in point, the Tribunal had to verify whether:
“the limitation of the applicants’ right of access to a court, as a result
of the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed as a rule, in the domestic legal
order of the Member States of the United Nations, by resolutions of the
Security Council adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations, in accordance with the relevant principles of international law
(in particular Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter), is inherent in that right
as it is guaranteed by jus cogens”(2)
Hence, the Tribunal considered that not only UNSC has to abide by PIL
peremptory norms, but also, and foremost, that it is empowered to
review their compatibility and, if necessary, divest the resolution from its
binding effects within the EU legal order. The Tribunal’s response is
articulated in two branches. Firstly, it weighs up conflicting interests, i.e.
the Applicant’s (“right of access to a court”) and UNSC’s (the
maintenance and restoration of peace and security vis-à-vis the terrorist
threat). It then concludes that the former’s particular interest cannot
“outweigh” the latter’s general interest. Secondly, it considers that, all in
(1) Ibid., § 282.
(2) Ibid., § 343.
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all, “the setting-up of a body such as the Sanctions Committee and the
opportunity, provided for by the legislation, of applying at any time to
that committee in order to have any individual case re-examined …
constitutes another reasonable method of affording adequate protection
of the applicants’ fundamental rights as recognised by jus cogens.”(1) On
this basis, the Tribunal dismissed the Applicant’s request for annulment
of the concerned EU act.
In fact, the latter filed an Appeal to the Court which eventually
overruled the Tribunal judgement and annul the Council regulation. The
Court firstly underlined that it is not its prerogative to review the validity
of an act adopted by an organ belonging to another legal order (UN),
especially since such an order enjoys the primacy by virtue of Art. 103
UNC. It then made a useful distinction between invalidity and
wrongfulness, stressing that:
“Any judgment given by the Community judicature deciding that a
Community measure intended to give effect to such a resolution is
contrary to a higher rule of law in the Community legal order would not
entail any challenge to the primacy of that resolution in international
law”(2)
Then, after underlining the principle of the UNC primacy, the Court
moved a step further by declaring:
“that primacy at the level of Community law would not, however,
extend to primary law, in particular to the general principles of which
fundamental rights form part”(3)
Now, contrary to what the Tribunal of first instance had previously
said, EU organs are not vested with the power to review, and if
necessary to annul, a UNSC resolution since the latter, as we have seen,
enjoys an “immunity of jurisdiction” by dint of Article 103 UNC. Though,
(1) Ibid., § 345.
(2) Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber), Case C-402/05, 3 September 2008, § 288.
(3) Ibid., § 308.
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if a UNSC resolution cannot be examined, the validity of an EU act
(“Regulation”) accordingly adopted to implement the former can and
must be reviewed by the Court, since it is precisely an act which has to
satisfy EU fundamental principles. Here the Court draws a boundary line
between two separate legal orders: on one side the international (i.e.
the UN system) and regional (the internal EU legal system) legal orders,
and on the other, the UNSC resolution and the EU Regulation. Within the
EU system, a UNSC resolution cannot be reviewed, while the EU
Regulation can and must be scrutinized by the competent EU judicial
organs (i.e., the Court) since it is going to deploy its legal effects in this
order. Following this logic, the Court declared:
“the review by the Court of the validity of any Community measure in
the light of fundamental rights must be considered to be the expression,
in a community based on the rule of law, of a constitutional guarantee
stemming from the EC Treaty as an autonomous legal system which is
not to be prejudiced by an international agreement”(1)
In the case in point, this determination led the Court to declare that
the EU regulation concerned is at variance with EU “fundamental
rights,”(2) and thus declaring its nullity.
What next then?(3) The Court’s reasoning is founded upon the
existence of two legal orders, which albeit being interconnected and
one (UN) holding primacy over the other (EU), still allows it to annul an
act belonging to the latter. As a consequence, the EU – and its Member
States – has to abide by UNSC resolutions, among which resolution 1373.
Yet, because of the annulment by the Court of the controversial EU
Regulation, the EU and its Member States will find themselves in an odd
position: on one side, they are at variance with UNSC resolution 1373,
(1) Ibid., § 316.
(2) “[T]he procedure before that Committee is still in essence diplomatic and intergovernmental, the
persons or entities concerned having no real opportunity of asserting their rights and that [SC] committee
[of sanctions] taking its decisions by consensus, each of its members having a right of veto”, Ibid., § 323.
(3) The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice in its last and definite judgement (18 July 2013)
largely confirmed this decision.
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thus infringing Art. 25 and 103 UNC,(1) and on the other they cannot but
respect the Court annulment of the EC Regulation. The relations
between these two legal orders take the shape of two different concepts
of Law, i.e. invalidity (of the EU Regulation within this legal system) and
wrongfulness (by the non-compliance of the EU and its Member States
with the UNSC Resolution). Therefore, and in a nutshell, what is
considered null and void in a given legal system puts EU Member States
at variance with the universal legal system, the UN and its primacy. In
fact, it would not have been different if the Constitutional Court of a UN
Member State had annulled an enactment made by its legislative power
in compliance with a UNSC resolution, but at variance with its municipal
system’s fundamental rights. All in all, the question revolves around the
relations between legal systems, of which one is superior to the other,
without, though, having the power to annul the acts adopted by the
inferior one. In fact, what occurs is almost the contrary, while the EU was
under the primacy of the UN, it annulled an act adopted in compliance
with a SC resolution (and ultimately with Article 25 UNC).

(1) As long as EU Member States do not abide by a UNSC resolution – within the EU legal system – EU and
its Member States engage their international responsibility, by committing what is called a “continuous
wrongful act”. See in this respect: G. Distefano, “Fait continu, fait compose et fait complexe dans le droit
de la responsabilité”, AFDI, Vol. 52 (2006), 1-54.
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المراجعة القضائية الدولية

لقانون شرعية األعمال المعتمدة
من قبل هيئات األمم المتحدة

األستاذ الدكتور /جيوفاني ديستيفانو

أستاذ القانون الدولي في جامعة نوشاتيل،
سويس ار

ملخص البحث باللغة العربية
يسعى هذا املقال املوجز إىل معاجلة املسألة الشائكة املتمثلة يف الرقابة القضائية عىل
األفعال التي تعتمدها هيئات األمم املتحدة .ويقترص التحليل بشكل صارم عىل الرقابة
القضائية الدولية هليئتني حمددتني ،أي جملس األمن واجلمعية العامة .وخالفا للعديد من
النظم القانونية املحلية ،حيث تتوخى هذه الرقابة القضائية إما بتمكني رصيح أو عرف
دستوري ،ال يتوخى ميثاق األمم املتحدة تكليف مماثل .ولذلك ،فإن هناك حاجة إىل
استحقاق قضائي حمدد ملحكمة العدل الدولية لتقييم مدى صحة قرار اعتمده اجلهازان
املشار إليهام أعاله .وقد حدث ذلك عن طريق "سيسني" (أو ِح َي َازة) ،يف حالة وجود
قضية خالفية عرضت عليها ،أو من خالل طلب حمدد من فتوى أصدرها أحد األجهزة
املخولة هبذه السلطة بموجب ميثاق األمم املتحدة ،وفقا للامدة  ،)1( 96وجملس األمن

]

20

][Year 32, Issue No. 73 January 2018

48

https://scholarworks.uaeu.ac.ae/sharia_and_law/vol2018/iss73/10

??????? ????? ????? ??? ?? ???????? ??????? ????? ?????? ??????? ???????? ???????? Distefano:

][INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE LEGALITY OF ACTS ADOPTED BY UNITED NATIONS ORGANS

واجلمع ية العامة .وقد حدث ذلك حتى اآلن سبع مرات منذ بدء نفاذ ميثاق األمم
املتحدة .وأخريا ،فإن إحدى املحاكامت القضائية الدولية خارج نطاق منظومة األمم
املتحدة ،أي حمكمة العدل يف االحتاد األورويب ،كانت من بني أكثر املحاكامت القضائية
الدولية بعيدة املدى عن صحة األفعال التي اعتمدهتا إحدى هيئات األمم املتحدة.
وتنص هذه املادة يف هناية املطاف عىل مجيع هذه األحكام والفتاوى الصادرة عن حمكمة
العدل الدولية وحمكمة لكسمربغ.
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